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Abstract 
Why is there so little R&D in the US? To quantify the effects of blocking patents on R&D, this 
paper firstly develops a tractable framework to model the transition dynamics of an economy with patent 
breadth and blocking patents in a generalized quality-ladder growth model. In this dynamic general-
equilibrium setting, a dynamic distortion on capital accumulation that has been neglected by previous 
studies on patent policy is identified. Then, the model is applied to the aggregate data to quantify the 
extents of underinvestment in R&D and inefficiency arising from blocking patents. This numerical 
exercise suggests a number of findings. Firstly, the market economy underinvests in R&D so long as a 
non-negligible fraction of long-run TFP growth is driven by R&D. Secondly, eliminating blocking patents 
increases R&D by about two to six times and hence is an effective solution to the potential problem of 
R&D underinvestment. Finally, the effects of eliminating blocking patents on consumption in the long 
run and during the transition dynamics are considered.  
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“Today, most basic and applied researchers are effectively standing on top of a huge 
pyramid… Of course, a pyramid can rise to far greater heights than could any one 
person... But what happens if, in order to scale the pyramid and place a new block on the 
top, a researcher must gain the permission of each person who previously placed a block 
in the pyramid, perhaps paying a royalty or tax to gain such permission? Would this 
system of intellectual property rights slow down the construction of the pyramid or limits 
its heights? … To complete the analogy, blocking patents play the role of the pyramid’s 
building blocks.” – Carl Shapiro (2001)  
 
1. Introduction 
What are the effects of blocking patents on research and development (R&D)? In an environment with 
only horizontal innovations, each invention is a different variety from each other. In this setting, a higher 
level of patent breadth increases the differentiability of each product that potentially results in a higher 
markup, a larger amount of monopolistic profits, and consequently, enhanced incentives for R&D. In a 
more complicated and realistic environment with sequential innovations, patent breadth takes the form of 
lagging breadth and leading breadth. Lagging breadth provides patent protection against imitation while 
leading breadth provides patent protection against subsequent innovations, which may infringe existing 
patents. A broadening of leading breadth may enhance or dampen the incentives for R&D depending on 
the extent of blocking patents, which is determined by the profit-sharing rule in patent pools.  
 To quantify the effects of blocking patents on R&D and consumption, this paper firstly develops 
a tractable framework to model the transition dynamics of an economy with patent breadth and blocking 
patents in a generalized quality-ladder growth model. In this dynamic general-equilibrium (DGE) setting, 
this paper analytically derives and identifies a dynamic distortionary effect on capital accumulation, 
which has been neglected by previous studies on patent policy focusing mostly on the static distortionary 
effect of markup pricing. Then, the model is applied to the aggregate data of the US’s economy in order 
to quantify the extents of underinvestment in R&D and inefficiency arising from blocking patents.  
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The numerical exercise suggests a number of findings. Firstly, eliminating blocking patents 
increases the equilibrium amount of R&D spending by about two to six times. Secondly, the market 
economy underinvests in R&D relative to the first-best optimum so long as a non-negligible fraction of 
long-run total factor productivity (TFP) growth is driven by R&D. To understand this finding, the quality-
ladder growth model involves multiple externalities in R&D: (a) a negative intratemporal congestion or 
duplication externality; (b) a positive or negative externality in intertemporal knowledge spillover; (c) the 
static consumer-surplus appropriability problem which is a positive externality; (d) the dynamic surplus 
appropriability problem in the form of sequential innovations which is a also a positive externality; (e) the 
business-stealing effect from creative destruction which is a negative externality; and (f) the negative 
effects of blocking patents on R&D in the case of suboptimal profit-sharing rules in patent pools. Given 
the existence of positive and negative externalities, whether the market economy over or under-invests in 
R&D depends crucially on the extents of intratemporal duplication and intertemporal spillover, which in 
turn are imputed from the balanced-growth condition between long-run TFP growth and R&D. Therefore, 
the larger is the fraction of long-run TFP growth driven by R&D, the more likely it is for the market 
economy to underinvest in R&D. Finally, the effects of eliminating blocking patents on consumption in 
the long run and during the transition dynamics are considered. When blocking patents are eliminated, the 
balanced-growth level of consumption increases significantly so long as a non-negligible fraction of TFP 
is driven by R&D. During the transition dynamics, the economy does not always experience a significant 
fall in consumption in response to the resource reallocation away from the production sector to the R&D 
sector. Over a range of parameters, upon eliminating blocking patents, consumption gradually rises 
towards the new balanced-growth path by reducing physical investment and temporarily running down 
the capital stock. This finding contrasts with Kwan and Lai (2003), whose model does not feature capital 
accumulation and hence predicts consumption losses from resource reallocation during the transition path.  
Shapiro (2001) describes the current innovation process as a “dense web of overlapping 
intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize 
new technology”, and he refers to this web as a “patent thicket”. The current paper develops a quantitative 
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framework to evaluate the effects of this patent thicket on R&D and provides an effective solution to the 
potential problem of R&D underinvestment identified by Jones and Williams (1998) and (2000). Jones 
and Williams (1998) develop a method to calculate the social rate of return to R&D based on 
endogenous-growth theory and find that the socially optimal amount of R&D spending is at least two to 
four times larger than the actual amount. Jones and Williams (2000) adopt a different approach by 
calibrating a variety-expanding growth model to the data and obtain a similar conclusion that there is 
underinvestment in R&D over a wide range of parameters.1 The current paper follows this latter approach 
by calibrating a generalized quality-ladder growth model with patent breadth in sequential innovations to 
show that the potential problem of R&D underinvestment arises from the inefficiency of blocking patents 
and eliminating them can be an effective solution. Furthermore, the calibration exercise takes into 
consideration Comin’s (2004) critique that long-run TFP growth may not be solely driven by R&D. 
 The current paper also complements the theoretical and qualitative studies on leading breadth 
from the patent-design literature,2 such as Green and Scotchmer (1995), O’Donoghue et al (1998) and 
Hopenhayn et al (2006), by providing a quantitative DGE analysis using the aggregate data. O’Donoghue 
and Zweimuller (2004) is the first study that merges the patent-design and endogenous growth literatures 
to analyze the effects of patentability requirement, lagging and leading breadth on economic growth in a 
simple quality-ladder growth model. However, their focus was not in quantifying the effects of blocking 
patents on R&D. In addition, the current paper generalizes their model in a number of dimensions in order 
to perform a quantitative analysis on the transition dynamics. Goh and Olivier (2002) analyze the welfare 
effects of patent breadth in a two-sector variety-expanding growth model, and Grossman and Lai (2004) 
analyze the welfare effects of strengthening patent protection in developing countries as a result of the 
TRIPS agreement using a multi-country variety-expanding model. However, these studies do not analyze 
patent breadth in an environment with sequential innovations. Li (2001) analyzes the optimal policy mix 
                                                 
1
 Stokey (1995) also calibrates an R&D-growth model to examine the extents of R&D underinvestment in the 
market economy. 
2
 The seminal work on optimal patent length is Nordhaus (1969). Some other recent studies on optimal patent design 
include Tandon (1982), Gilbert and Shapiro (1990), Klemperer (1990), O’Donoghue (1998), Hunt (1999) and 
Scotchmer (2004). Judd (1985) provides the first dynamic general equilibrium analysis on optimal patent length.  
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of R&D subsidy and lagging breadth in a quality-ladder model with endogenous step size, but he does not 
consider leading breadth. Furthermore, all the abovementioned studies are qualitatively oriented and do 
not feature capital accumulation so that the dynamic distortion is absent. 
 Laitner (1982) identifies in an exogenous growth model with overlapping generations of 
households that the existence of an oligopolistic sector and its resulting pure profits as financial assets 
creates both the usual static distortion and an additional dynamic distortion on capital accumulation due to 
the crowding out of households’ portfolio space, and he finds that the latter is more significant than the 
former. The current paper extends this study to show that this dynamic distortion also plays an important 
role and through a different channel in an R&D-driven endogenous growth model in which both patents 
and physical capital are owned by households as financial assets.  
 In terms of quantitative analysis, this paper relates to Kwan and Lai (2003) and Chu (2007). 
Kwan and Lai (2003) numerically evaluate the effects of extending the effective lifetime of patent in the 
variety-expanding model originating from Romer (1990) and find substantial welfare gains despite the 
temporary consumption losses during the transition path in their model. Chu (2007) uses a generalized 
variety-expanding model and finds that whether or not an extension in the patent length is effective in 
stimulating R&D depends crucially on the patent-value depreciation rate. At the empirical range of 
patent-value depreciation rates estimated by previous studies, patent extension has only limited effects on 
R&D and thus social welfare. Therefore, Chu (2007) and the current paper together provide a comparison 
on the effectiveness of increasing patent length and eliminating blocking patents in solving the R&D 
underinvestment problem. The crucial difference between these two policy instruments arises because 
patent extension increases future monopolistic profits while eliminating blocking patents raises current 
monopolistic profits for the inventors.   
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 calibrates 
the model and numerically evaluates the effects of eliminating blocking patents. The final section 
concludes with some important caveats. Appendix I contains the proofs.   
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2. The Model 
The model is a generalized version of Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992). To 
prevent the model from overestimating the social benefits of R&D and hence the extents of R&D 
underinvestment, long-run TFP growth is assumed to be driven by R&D as well as an exogenous process 
as in Comin (2004). In order to perform a more realistic calibration, the model is further modified to 
include physical capital, which is a factor input for the production of intermediate goods and R&D, and 
the final goods can be used for consumption or investment in capital. Finally, the class of first-generation 
R&D-driven endogenous growth models, such as Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt 
(1992), exhibits scale effects and is inconsistent with the empirical evidence in Jones (1995a).3 In the 
present model, scale effects are eliminated by assuming decreasing individual R&D productivity as in 
Segerstrom (1998), which becomes a semi-endogenous growth model.4  
 The various components of the model are presented in Sections 2.1–2.7, and the decentralized 
equilibrium is defined in Section 2.8. Section 2.9 summarizes the laws of motion that characterize the 
transition dynamics, and Section 2.10 analyzes the balanced-growth path. Section 2.11 derives the first-
best optimal allocations. 
 
2.1. Representative Household 
The infinitely-lived representative household maximizes life-time utility that is a function of per-capita 
consumption tc  of the numeraire final goods and is assumed to have the iso-elastic form given by 
(1) dtceU ttn
σ
σ
ρ
−
=
−
∞
−−
∫ 1
1
0
)(
. 
                                                 
3
 See, e.g. Jones (1999) for an excellent theoretical analysis on scale effects. 
4
 In a semi-endogenous growth model, the balanced-growth rate is determined by the exogenous labor-force growth 
rate. An increase in the share of R&D factor inputs raises the level of the balanced growth path while holding the 
balanced-growth rate constant. Since increasing R&D has no long-run growth effect in this model, the estimated 
effects on consumption in the numerical exercises are likely to be more conservative than in other fully endogenous 
growth models.  
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1≥σ  is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The household has )exp(
.0 tnLLt =  
members at time t. The population size at time 0 is normalized to one, and 0>n  is the exogenous 
population growth rate. ρ  is the subjective discount rate. To ensure that lifetime utility is bounded, it is 
assumed that n>ρ . The household maximizes (1) subject to a sequence of budget constraints given by  
(2)  ttttt cwnraa −+−= )(& . 
Each member of the household inelastically supplies one unit of homogenous labor in each period to earn 
a real wage income tw . ta  is the value of risk-free financial assets in the form of patents and physical 
capital owned by each household member, and tr  is the real rate of return on these assets. The familiar 
Euler equation derived from the intertemporal optimization is  
(3)  σρ /)( −= ttt rcc& . 
 
2.2. Final Goods 
This sector is characterized by perfect competition, and the producers take both the output price and input 
prices as given. The production function for the final goods tY  is a Cobb-Douglas aggregator of a 
continuum of differentiated quality-enhancing intermediate goods )( jX t  for ]1,0[∈j  given by  
(4) 






= ∫
1
0
)(lnexp djjXY tt .5 
The familiar aggregate price index is  
(5) 1)(lnexp
1
0
=







= ∫ djjPP tt , 
                                                 
5
 To maintain the analytical tractability of the aggregate conditions, a Cobb-Douglas aggregator instead of the more 
general CES aggregator is adopted. With the CES aggregator, it becomes very difficult to derive the aggregate 
conditions when there are both competitive and monopolistic industries in the intermediate-goods sector. 
Furthermore, computation of the transition dynamics becomes possible under the Cobb-Douglas aggregator. 
Although the arrival rate of innovations varies along the transitional path, a tractable form for the law of motion for 
aggregate technology can still be derived under the Cobb-Douglas aggregator but not under the CES aggregator. 
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and the demand curve for each variety of intermediate goods is  
(6) ttt YjXjP =)()( . 
 
2.3. Intermediate Goods 
There is a continuum of industries producing the differentiated quality-enhancing intermediate goods 
)( jX t  for ]1,0[∈j . A fraction )1,0[∈θ  of the industries is characterized by perfect competition 
because innovations in these industries are assumed to be non-patentable. Each of the remaining 
industries is dominated by a temporary industry leader, who owns the patent for the latest R&D-driven 
technology for production. Without loss of generality, the industries are ordered such that industries 
),0[ θ∈′j  are competitive and industries ]1,[θ∈j  are monopolistic. The production function in each 
industry has constant returns to scale in labor and capital inputs and is given by  
(7) )()()( 1
,,
)( jLjKZzjX txtxtjmt t αα −=  
for ]1,0[∈j . )(
,
jK tx  and )(, jL tx  are respectively the capital and labor inputs for producing 
intermediate-goods j at time t. )exp(0 tgZZ Zt =  represents an exogenous process of productivity 
improvement that is common across all industries and is freely available to all producers. )( jmtz  is 
industry j’s level of R&D-driven technology, which is increasing over time through R&D investment and 
successful innovations. 1>z  is the exogenous step-size of a technological improvement arising from 
each innovation. )( jmt , which is an integer, is the number of innovations that has occurred in industry j 
as of time t. The marginal cost of production in industry j is  
(8) 
αα
αα
−






−






=
1
)( 1
1)( tt
t
jmt
wR
Zz
jMC
t
,  
where tR  is the rental price of capital. The optimal price for the leaders in the monopolistic industries is a 
constant markup ),( ηµ z  over the marginal cost of production given by  
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(9) )(),()( jMCzjP tt ηµ=  
for ]1,[θ∈j . The markup ),( ηµ z  is a function of the quality step size z  and the level of patent breadth 
η  (to be defined in Section 2.4). The competitive industries are characterized by competitive pricing such 
that  
(10) )()( jMCjP tt ′=′  
for ),0[ θ∈′j . The aggregate price level is   
(11) tt MCzP ),,(~ θηµ= , 
where θηµθηµ −≡ 1),(),,(~ zz  is the aggregate markup in the economy. The aggregate marginal cost is  
(12) 






= ∫
1
0
)(lnexp djjMCMC tt . 
 
2.4. Patent Breadth 
Before providing the underlying derivations, this section firstly presents the Bertrand equilibrium price 
and the amount of monopolistic profits generated by an invention and captured by a patent pool under 
different levels of patent breadth, which is denoted by η .  
(13) )()( jMCzjP tt η=  
(14) )()()1()( jXjMCzj ttt −= ηpi  
for ,...}3,2,1{∈η  and ]1,[θ∈j . The expression for the equilibrium price is consistent with the seminal 
work of Gilbert and Shapiro’s (1990) interpretation of “breadth as the ability of the patentee to raise 
price.” A broader patent breadth corresponds to a larger η , and vice versa. Therefore, an increase in 
patent breadth potentially enhances the incentives for R&D by raising the amount of monopolistic profits 
generated by each invention but worsens the distortionary effects of markup pricing.  
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 The patent-design literature has identified and analyzed two types of patent breadth in an 
environment with sequential innovations: (a) lagging breadth; and (b) leading breadth. In a standard 
quality-ladder growth model, lagging breadth (i.e. patent protection against imitation) is assumed to be 
complete while leading breadth (i.e. patent protection against subsequent innovations) is assumed to be 
zero. The following analysis focuses on non-zero leading breadth, and the formulation originates from 
O’Donoghue and Zweimuller (2004). A discussion of incomplete lagging breadth is in Appendix II.  
The level of patent breadth leadlag ηηη +=  can be decomposed into lagging breadth denoted by 
]1,0(∈lagη  and leading breadth denoted by ,...}2,1,0{∈leadη . In the following, complete lagging 
breadth is assumed such that leadηη += 1 . Nonzero leading breadth protects patentholders against 
subsequent innovations and gives the patentholders property rights over future inventions. For example, if 
1=leadη , then the most recent innovation infringes the patent of the second-most recent inventor. If 
2=leadη , then the most recent innovation infringes the patents of the second-most and the third-most 
recent inventors, etc. The following diagram illustrates the concept of nonzero leading breadth with an 
example of leading breadth equal two. 
 
Therefore, nonzero leading breadth facilitates the new industry leader and the previous inventors, whose 
patents are infringed, to consolidate market power through licensing agreements and the formation of a 
patent pool resulting in a higher markup.6 The Bertrand equilibrium price with leading breadth is  
(15) )()( 1 jMCzjP tt leadη+=  
for ,...}2,1,0{∈leadη  and ]1,[θ∈j . Assumption 1 is sufficient to derive this equilibrium markup price.  
 
                                                 
6
 See, e.g. Gallini (2002) and O’Donoghue and Zweimuller (2004), for a discussion on market-power consolidation 
through licensing agreements.  
)( jmtz  2)( +jmtz  
patent protection for )( jmtz  
1)( +jmtz  
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Assumption 1: An infringed patentholder cannot become the next industry leader while she is still 
covered by a licensing agreement in that industry.7 
 
Then, the total amount of monopolistic profits captured by the patent pool at time t is  
(16) )()()1()( 1 jXjMCzj ttt lead −= +ηpi  
for ,...}2,1,0{∈leadη  and ]1,[θ∈j . 
 The share of profits obtained by each generation of patentholders in the patent pool depends on 
the profit-sharing rule (i.e. the terms in the licensing agreement). A stationary bargaining outcome is 
assumed to simplify the analysis.  
 
Assumption 2: The set of profit-sharing rule is symmetric across industries and is stationary. For each 
degree of leading breadth ,...}2,1,0{∈leadη , the profit-sharing rule is ]1,0[),...,( 1 ∈= ηη σσσ lead , where 
iσ  is the share of profits received by the i-th most recent inventor, and 11 =∑ =η σi i .  
 
Although the shares of profits and licensing fees eventually received by the owner of an invention are 
constant overtime, the present value of profits is determined by the actual profit-sharing rule. The two 
extreme cases are: (a) complete frontloading )0,...,0,1(=leadησ ; and (b) complete backloading 
)1,...,0,0(=leadησ . Complete frontloading maximizes the incentives on R&D provided by leading 
breadth by maximizing the present value of profits received by an inventor. The opposite effect of 
blocking patents arises when profits are backloaded, and complete backloading maximizes this damaging 
                                                 
7
 The sufficiency of this assumption in determining the markup price is most easily understood with an example. 
Suppose leading breadth is one and lagging breadth is complete, the lower bound on the profit-maximizing markup 
is the square of z , which is the limit price from the collusion of the most recent and the second-most recent 
inventors against the third-most recent inventor, whose patent is not infringed upon by the most recent invention. In 
this example, the limit-pricing markup would be even larger if the third-most recent inventor happens to be the new 
industry leader. Continuing this reasoning, the markup could grow without bound; therefore, Assumption 1 is made 
to rule out this possibility. The empirical plausibility of this assumption is appealed to the existence of antitrust 
policy.  
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effect on the incentives for R&D. Section 2.7 derives the law of motion for the market value of ownership 
in patent pools for each generation of patentholders.  
 
2.5. Aggregation 
Define 






≡ ∫ zdjjmA tt ln)(exp
1
0
 as the aggregate level of R&D-driven technology. Also, define total 
labor and capital inputs for production as ∫=
1
0
,,
)( djjKK txtx  and ∫=
1
0
,,
)( djjLL txtx  respectively. 
 
Lemma 1: The aggregate production function for the final goods is  
(17) ααηϑ −= 1
,,
)( txtxttt LKZAY , 
where )1/()()( θθηϑ ηθη −+≡ zz  is decreasing in η  for )1,0(∈θ . 
 
)(ηϑ  represents the static distortionary effect of markup pricing. Markup pricing in the monopolistic 
industries distorts production towards the competitive industries and reduces the output of the final goods. 
Also, )(ηϑ  is initially decreasing in θ  and subsequently increasing with 1)( =ηϑ  for }1,0{∈θ . 
Therefore, at least over a range of parameters, the static distortionary effect becomes increasingly severe 
as the fraction of competitive industries increases.  
The market-clearing condition for the final goods is  
(18) ttt ICY += , 
where ttt cLC =  is the aggregate consumption and tI  is the investment in physical capital. The factor 
payments for the final goods are  
(19) ttxttxtt KRLwY pi++= ,, . 
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∫=
1
)(
θ
pipi djjtt  is the total amount of monopolistic profits. Substituting (7) and (8) into (14) and then 
summing over all monopolistic industries yields  
(20) tt Y
z
z





 −
−= η
η
θpi 1)1( . 
Therefore, the growth rate of monopolistic profits equals the growth rate of output. The amount of factor 
payments for labor and capital inputs in the intermediate-goods sector are respectively 
(21) ttxt Y
z
zLw 




 −+
−= η
η θθ
α
1)1(
,
, 
(22) ttxt Y
z
zKR 




 −+
= η
η θθ
α
1
,
. 
(22) shows that the markup drives a wedge between the marginal product of capital and its rental price. 
As will be shown below, this wedge creates a distortion on the rate of investment in physical capital. 
Finally, the correct value of gross domestic product (GDP) should include the amount of investment in 
R&D such that  
(23) trttrttt KRLwYGDP ,, ++= .8 
trL ,  and trK ,  are respectively the number of workers and the amount of capital for R&D.  
 
2.6. Capital Accumulation 
The market-clearing condition for physical capital is  
(24) trtxt KKK ,, += .  
tK  is the total amount of capital available in the economy at time t . The law of motion for capital is  
                                                 
8
 In the national income account, private spending in R&D is treated as an expenditure on intermediate goods. 
Therefore, the values of investment and GDP in the data are 
t
I  and 
t
Y  respectively. The Bureau of Economic 
Analysis and the National Science Foundation’s R&D satellite account provides preliminary estimates on the effects 
of including R&D as an intangible asset in the national income accounts.  
 - 13 - 
(25) δttt KIK −=&   
δ  is the rate of depreciation. The endogenous rate of investment in physical capital is  
(26) ttttt YKKKi /)/( δ+= &   
for all t. The no-arbitrage condition δ−= tt Rr  for the holding of capital and (22) imply that the capital-
output ratio is  
(27) ))(1(
)1(
,
δ
θθα
η
η
+−
−+
=
ttKt
t
rsz
z
Y
K
. 
tKs ,  is the endogenous share of capital in the R&D sector. Substituting (27) into (26) yields 
(28) 





+
+
−
−+
= δ
δθθα
η
η
t
tt
tK
t
r
KK
sz
zi /)1(
)1(
,
&
.  
In the Romer model, (skilled) labor is the only factor input for R&D (i.e. 0
,
=tKs ); therefore, the 
distortionary effect of markup pricing on the steady-state rate of investment is unambiguously negative 
(i.e. 0/ <∂∂ ηi ). In the current model, there is an opposing positive effect operating through the R&D 
share of capital. Intuitively, an increase in patent breadth potentially raises the private return on R&D and 
increases the R&D share of capital. Proposition 2 in Section 2.11 shows that the negative distortionary 
effect still dominates if the intermediate-goods sector is at least as capital intensive as the R&D sector. 
 
2.7. R&D 
)( jVt  is the market value of the patent pool created by the most recent invention in industry ]1,[θ∈j  at 
time t and is determined by the following no-arbitrage condition  
(29) )()()()( jVjVjjVr tttttt λpi −+= & . 
The first terms in the right is the flow profits generated by the patent pool at time t. The second term is the 
capital gain due to the growth in the amount of monopolistic profits. The third term is the expected value 
of capital loss due to creative destruction, and tλ  is the Poisson arrival rate of the next invention that 
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creates a new patent pool. However, the incentives for R&D depend on the market value of the shares in 
patent pools obtained by an inventor. Denote )(
,
jV ti  for },...,1{ η∈i  as the market value of ownership in 
patent pools for the i-th most recent inventor in industry ]1,[θ∈j .  
 
Proposition 1: )(
,
jV ti  for },...,2,1{ η∈i  and ]1,[θ∈j  is determined by the following law of motion 
(30) ))()(()()()(
,,1,, jVjVjVjjVr titittititit −++= +λpiσ & , 
where 0)(
,1 =+ jV tη . The no-arbitrage condition for )(,1 jV t  can be re-expressed as  
(31) 
















−+
= ∑ ∏
= =
−
η
λλσpi 1 1 ,,
1
,1 )(/)(
1)()(
k
k
i tititt
k
tktt jVjVrjjV & . 
 
Assumption 4: Innovation successes of the R&D entrepreneurs are randomly assigned to the industries 
in the intermediate-goods sector.  
 
The expected present value of an invention obtained by the most recent inventor at time t is  
(32) 
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The arrival rate of an innovation success for an R&D entrepreneur ]1,0[∈h  is a function of labor input 
)(
,
hL tr  and capital input )(, hK tr  given by 
(33) )()()( 1
,,
hLhKh trtrtt
ββϕλ −= .9 
tϕ  is a productivity parameter that the entrepreneurs take as given. The expected profit from R&D is  
(34) )()()()]([
,,,1, hKRhLwhVhE trttrttttrt −−= λpi . 
                                                 
9
 This specification nests the “knowledge-driven” specification in Romer (1990) as a special case with 0=β  and 
the “lab equipment” specification in River-Batiz and Romer (1991) as a special case with αβ = .  
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The first-order conditions are  
(35) ttrtrtt whLhKV =− βϕβ ))(/)(()1( ,,,1 ,  
(36) ttrtrtt RhLhKV =−1,,,1 ))(/)(( βϕβ .  
 To eliminate scale effects and capture various externalities, the individual R&D productivity 
parameter tϕ  at time t  is assumed to be decreasing in the level of R&D-driven technology tA  such that  
(37) φ
γββϕϕ
−
−−
= 1
11
,,
)(
t
trtr
t A
LK
, 
where ∫=
1
0
,,
)( dhhKK trtr  and ∫=
1
0
,,
)( dhhLL trtr . ]1,0(∈γ  captures the intratemporal negative 
congestion or duplication externality or the so-called “stepping on toes” effects, and )1,(−∞∈φ  captures 
the externality of intertemporal knowledge spillovers.10 Given that the arrival of innovations follows a 
Poisson process, the law of motion for R&D-driven technology is given by   
(38) zLKAzLKAzAA trtrttrtrttttt ln)(lnln 1 ,,1 ,, ϕϕλ γββφββ −− ===& .11 
 
2.8. Decentralized Equilibrium 
The analysis starts at 0=t . The equilibrium is a sequence of prices ∞
=0,1 }),(,,,{ tttttt VjPRrw  and a 
sequence of allocations ∞
=0,,,, },),(),(),(),(),(,,,,{ ttttrtrtxtxttttt LKhLhKjLjKjXYIca  such that they are 
                                                 
10
 This specification captures how semi-endogenous growth models eliminate scale effects as in Jones (1995b). 
)1,0(∈φ  corresponds to the “standing on shoulder” effect, in which the economy-wide R&D productivity ϕqA  
increases as the level of R&D-driven technology increases (see the law of motion for R&D-driven technology). On 
the other hand, )0,(−∞∈φ  corresponds to the “fishing out” effect, in which early technology is relatively easy to 
develop and ϕqA  decreases as the level of R&D-driven technology increases. 
11
 This convenient expression is derived as zdzdjjmA
t
tt ln)(ln)(ln
0
1
0









∫=∫= ττλ ; then, simple differentiation 
yields zAA ttt ln/ λ=& . 
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consistent with the initial conditions },,,,{ 00000 ϕAZLK  and their subsequent laws of motions. Also, in 
each period,  
(a) the representative household chooses },{ tt ca  to maximize utility taking },{ tt rw  as given;  
(b) the competitive firms in the final-goods sector choose )}({ jX t  to maximize profits according to 
the production function taking )}({ jPt  as given; 
(c) each industry leader in the intermediate-goods sector chooses )}(),(),({
,,
jLjKjP txtxt  to 
maximize profits according to the Bertrand price competition and the production function taking 
},{ tt wR  as given;  
(d) the competitive firms in the intermediate-goods sector choose )}(),({
,,
jLjK txtx ′′  to maximize 
profits according to the production function taking },),({ ttt wRjP ′  as given;  
(e) each entrepreneur in the R&D sector chooses )}(),({
,,
hLhK trtr  to maximize profits according to 
the R&D production function taking },,,{
,1 tttt wRVϕ  as given;  
(f) the market for the final-goods clears such that ttt ICY += ; 
(g) the full employment of capital such that trtxt KKK ,, += ; and 
(h) the full employment of labors such that trtxt LLL ,, += . 
 
2.9. Transition Dynamics 
The transition dynamics of the decentralized equilibrium is characterized by the following differential 
equations. The capital stock is a predetermined variable and evolves according to  
(39) δtttt KCYK −−=& . 
R&D-driven technology is also a predetermined variable and evolves according to  
(40) zAA ttt lnλ=& . 
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Consumption is a jump variable and evolves according to the Euler equation  
(41) σρ /)( −= ttt rcc& . 
The market value of ownership in patent pools is also a jump variable and evolves according to  
(42) titittittti VVrV piσλλ −−+= + ,1,, )(&  
for },...,2,1{ η∈i  and 0
,1 =+ tVη . 
At the aggregate level, the generalized quality-ladder model is similar to Jones’s (1995b) model, 
whose dynamic properties have been investigated by a number of recent studies. For example, Arnold 
(2006) analytically derives the uniqueness and local stability of the steady state with certain parameter 
restrictions. Steger (2005) and Trimborn et al (2006) numerically evaluate the transition dynamics of the 
model. In summary, to solve the model numerically, I firstly transform },,,{
,tittt VcAK  in the differential 
equations into its stationary form,12 and then, compute the transition path from the old steady state to the 
new one using the relaxation algorithm developed by Trimborn et al (2006).  
 
2.10. Balanced-Growth Path 
Equating the first-order conditions (21) and (35) and imposing the balanced-growth condition on R&D-
driven technology 
(43) zKLg trtrtA ln,1 , ββϕ −=  
yield the steady-state R&D share of labor inputs given by  
(44) )()1(
)1)(1(
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12
 Refer to Appendix III for the details. 
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where ]1,0()(
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 is defined as the backloading discount factor. For 
example, in the case of complete frontloading, 1)( =leadησν . Similarly, solving (22), (36) and (43) yields 
the steady-state R&D share of capital inputs given by  
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On the balanced-growth path, tc  increases at a constant rate cg , so that the steady-state real 
interest rate is  
(46)  σρ cgr += . 
The balanced-growth rate of R&D technology Ag  is related to the labor-force growth rate such that 
(47) ngz
A
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t
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Then, the steady-state rate of creative destruction is zg A ln/=λ . The balanced-growth rates of other 
variables are given as follows. Given that the steady-state investment rate is constant, the balanced-
growth rate of per capita consumption is 
(48) ngg Yc −= . 
From the aggregate production function (17), the balanced-growth rates of output and capital are  
(49) )1/()( α−++== ZAKY ggngg . 
Using (47) and (49), the balanced-growth rate of R&D-driven technology is determined by the exogenous 
labor-force growth rate n  and productivity growth rate Zg  given by  
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Long-run TFP growth denoted by ZATFP ggg +≡  is empirically observed. For a given TFPg , a higher 
value of Zg  implies a lower value of Ag  as well as a lower calibrated value for )1/( φγ −  indicating 
smaller social benefits from R&D.  
 
2.11. First-Best Optimal Allocations 
This section firstly characterizes the socially optimal equilibrium rate of investment and R&D shares of 
labor and capital and then derives the dynamic distortion on capital accumulation.  
 
Lemma 2: The modified Golden-rule rate of investment on the balanced-growth path is  
(51) δσρ
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and the socially optimal steady-state R&D shares of labor *Ls  and capital *Ks  are respectively  
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(52) and (53) indicate the various sources of R&D externalities: (a) the negative congestion externality 
]1,0(∈γ ; (b) the positive or negative externality in intertemporal knowledge spillovers )1,(−∞∈φ ; (c) 
the static consumer-surplus appropriability problem ]1,0(/)1)(1( ∈−− ηηθ zz , which is a positive 
externality; (d) the markup distortion in driving a wedge of 1/)1( ≥−+ ηη θθ zz  between the factor 
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payments for production inputs and their marginal products; (e) the positive externality of sequential 
innovations together with the negative externality of the business-stealing effect given by the difference 
between ))1(/( AcA ggng +−+− σρ  and ))1(/( λσρλ +−+− cgn ; and (f) the negative effects of 
blocking patents on R&D through the backloading discount factor ]1,0()( ∈leadησν . Given the existence 
of positive and negative externalities, it requires a numerical calibration to the data that will be performed 
in Section 3 to determine whether the market economy over- or under-invests in R&D. 
 If the market economy underinvests in R&D as also suggested by Jones and Williams (1998) and 
(2000), the government may want to increase patent breadth to reduce the extent of market failures. 
However, the following proposition states that even holding the effects of blocking patents constant, an 
increase in η  mitigates the problem of R&D underinvestment at the costs of worsening the dynamic 
distortionary effect on capital accumulation in addition to increasing the static distortionary effect.  
 
Proposition 2a: The decentralized equilibrium rate of investment is below the socially optimal investment 
rate if either there is underinvestment in R&D or labor is the only factor input for R&D.  
 
Proposition 2b: Holding the backloading discount factor ν  constant, an increase in patent breadth leads 
to a reduction in the decentralized equilibrium rate of investment if the intermediate-goods sector is at 
least as capital intensive as the R&D sector.   
 
3. Calibration 
Using the framework developed above, this section provides a quantitative assessment on the effects of 
eliminating blocking patents. Figure 1 shows that private spending on R&D in the US as a share of GDP 
has been rising sharply since the beginning of the 80’s. Then, after a few years, the number of patents 
granted by the US Patent and Trademark Office also began to increase rapidly as shown in Figure 2. 
Given the patent policy changes in the 80’s, the structural parameters are calibrated using long-run 
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aggregate data of the US’s economy from 1953 to 1980 to examine the extent of R&D underinvestment 
before these policy changes. The goal of this numerical exercise is to quantify the effects of eliminating 
blocking patents on R&D and consumption.  
 
3.1. Backloading Discount Factor 
The first step is to calibrate the structural parameters and the steady-state value of the backloading 
discount factor ν . The average annual TFP growth rate TFPg  is 1.33%,
13
 and the labor-force growth rate 
n is 1.94%.14 The annual depreciation rate δ  on physical capital and the household’s discount rate are set 
to conventional values of 8% and 4% respectively. For the aggregate markup θµµ −= 1~ , Laitner and 
Stolyarov (2004) estimate that µ~  is about 1.1 (i.e. a 10% markup) in the data. For a given µ~ , each value 
of θ  (i.e. the fraction of competitive industries in the intermediate-goods sector) corresponds to a unique 
value for the industry markup µ  in monopolistic industries, and I will consider a wide range of values for 
}75.0,5.0,25.0,0{
...
∈θ . A number of structural studies based on patent renewal models has estimated 
the arrival rate of innovations λ , and I will consider a reasonable range of values for ]20.0,04.0[
.
∈λ .15 
For the capital intensity parameter in the R&D sector, I will set αβ =  as the benchmark case.16  
 For the remaining parameters },,{ σαν , the model provides three steady-state conditions for the 
calibration: (a) R&D as a share of GDP; (b) labor share; and (c) the rate of investment in physical capital.   
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13
 Multifactor productivity for the private non-farm business sector is obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
14
 The data on the annual average size of the labor force is obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
15
 For example, Lanjouw (1998) structurally estimate a patent renewal model using patent renewal data in a number 
of industries from Germany, and the estimated probability of obsolescence ranges 7% for computer patents to 12% 
for engine patents. Also, a conventional value for the rate of depreciation in patent value is about 15% (e.g. Pakes 
(1986)). In the current model, the patent-value depreciation rate is given by Yg−λ , which implies that λ  should be 
at least 15%. On the other hand, Caballero and Jaffe (2002) estimate a mean rate of creative destruction of about 4%. 
16
 I have considered different plausible values for }3,2,,0{ αααβ ∈  as a sensitivity analysis. The extent of R&D 
underinvestment and the effects of eliminating blocking patent and increasing patent breadth on long-run 
consumption are robust to these parameter changes.  
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The average private spending on R&D as a share of GDP is 1.15%,17 and the labor share is set to a 
conventional value of 0.7. The long-run ratio of business investment to non-housing GDP is 14%.18  
Table 1 presents the calibrated values for the structural parameters along with the real interest rate 
)1/(
.
ασρ −+= TFPgr  and the industry markup )1/(1)1.1( θµ −=  for }75.0,5.0,25.0,0{ ...∈θ  and 
]20.0,04.0[
.
∈λ .  
[insert Table 1 here] 
Table 1 shows that the calibrated values for },,{ rσα  are invariant to different values of λ  for a given 
value of θ . The calibrated value for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (i.e. σ/1 ) is about 0.25, 
which is closed to the empirical estimates from econometric studies.19 The implied real interest rate is 
about 11%, which is higher than the historical rate of return on the US’s stock market, and this higher 
interest rate implies a lower optimal level of R&D spending and a higher steady-state value of the 
backloading discount factor. As a result, the model is less likely to overestimate the extent of R&D 
underinvestment and the degree of inefficiency from blocking patents. Re-expressing (55) into (58) shows 
that ν  decreases as λ  increases. 
(57) λασρ
µµθλ
ν
+−−+−
−−
= )1/()1(
/)1)(1(&
TFPgnGDP
DR
. 
                                                 
17
 The data is obtained from the National Science Foundation and the Bureau of Economic Analysis. R&D is net of 
federal spending, and GDP is net of government spending. The observations in the data series of R&D spending are 
missing for 1954 and 1955.  
18
 Business investment refers to total private investment less investment in owner-occupied housing, and this data is 
obtained from Laitner and Stolyarov (2005). 
19
 It is well-known that there is a discrepancy between the estimated elasticity of intertemporal substitution from 
dynamic macro models (closed to 1) and econometric studies (closed to 0). Guvenen (2006) shows that this 
discrepancy is due to the heterogeneity in households’ preferences and wealth inequality. In short, the average 
investor has a high elasticity of intertemporal substitution while the average consumer has a much lower elasticity. 
Since my interest is on consumption, it is appropriate to calibrate the value of σ  according to the average consumer. 
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Furthermore, the fact that the calibrated values of ]424.0,169.0[
.
∈ν  are very small suggests a severe 
degree of inefficiency from blocking patents in the economy. Therefore, eliminating blocking patents may 
be an effective method to stimulate R&D. After calibrating the externality parameters and computing the 
first-best level of R&D spending, the effects of eliminating blocking patents will be quantified.  
 
3.2. Externality Parameters 
The second step is to calibrate the values for the externality parameters γ  (intratemporal duplication) and 
φ  (intertemporal spillover). For each value of Ag , Zg , n , α  and β , the balanced-growth condition 
(50) determines a unique value for )1/( φγ − , which is sufficient to determine the new balanced-growth 
level of consumption. However, holding )1/( φγ −  constant, a larger γ  implies a faster rate of 
convergence to the new balanced-growth path; therefore, it is important to consider different values of γ . 
As for the value of Ag , I will set TFPA gg .ξ=  for ]1,0[ .∈ξ . The parameter ξ  captures the fraction of 
long-run TFP growth that is driven by R&D, and the remaining fraction is driven by the exogenous 
process tZ  such that TFPZ gg )1( ξ−= . Table 2 presents the calibrated values of φ  for a subset of values 
for ]0.1,1.0[
.
∈γ  and ]1,0[
.
∈ξ .  
[insert Table 2 here] 
Table 2 shows that the calibrated values for φ  are very similar across different values of θ  implying that 
the first-best level of R&D spending and the extent of R&D over- or underinvestment are about the same 
across different values of θ . 
 
3.3. First-Best Level of R&D Spending 
This section calculates the first-best level of R&D share )1/()1/()1( ****
. KKLL ssss −+−− αα . Figure 3 
plots the first-best R&D shares for ]0.1,1.0[
.
∈γ  and ]1,0[
.
∈ξ . 
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[insert Figure 3 here] 
Figure 3 shows that there was underinvestment in R&D prior to 1980 over a wide range of parameters 
unless γ  and ξ  are very small. Since it is difficult to determine the empirical value of ξ , I will leave it 
to the readers to decide on their preferred values and continue to present results for a range of parameters.  
 
3.4. Eliminating Blocking patents  
Given the calibrated structural parameters, this section quantifies the effects of eliminating blocking 
patents on R&D and consumption. Upon eliminating blocking patents (i.e. setting 1=ν ), the steady-state 
share of R&D given by YRKwL rr /)( +  would increase substantially to the values in Table 3.  
[insert Table 3 here] 
In the following, the effect of eliminating blocking patents is firstly expressed in terms of the percentage 
change in the balanced-growth level of consumption per year. Along the balanced-growth path, per capita 
consumption increases at an exogenous rate cg . Therefore, after dropping the exogenous growth path and 
some constant terms and solving for the balanced-growth path of R&D technology and steady-state 
capital-labor ratio, I derive the expression for the endogenous parts of long-run consumption as a function 
of the steady-state value of the backloading discount factor ν  through the capital investment rate )(νi , 
and the R&D shares of capital and labor (where )()()( ννν KLr sss ==  because βα = ). 
 
Lemma 3: For βα = , the expression for the endogenous parts of consumption on the balanced-growth 
path is 
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 The proof in Appendix I also derives the expression for the general case in which βα ≠ . 
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Therefore, in the case of a change in ν , the percentage change in long-run consumption can be 
decomposed into four terms.  
(59) 
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Figure 4 shows that eliminating blocking patents should have a substantial positive effect on long-run 
consumption unless ξ  is very small. Also, a back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that the change in 
consumption mostly comes from )(ln)))1)(1/((( ναγφαγ rs∆−−− ; in other words, other general-
equilibrium effects only have secondary impacts on long-run consumption. 
[insert Figure 4 here] 
 After examining the effect on long-run consumption, the next numerical exercise computes the 
entire growth path of consumption upon eliminating blocking patents. Figure 5a compares the transition 
path (in blue) of log consumption per capita with its original balanced-growth path (in red) and its new 
balanced-growth path (in green) for the following parameters }08.0,0,06.0,7.0,7.0{},,,,{ =δθλγξ  to 
illustrate the transition dynamics. Then, I will discuss the effects of changing these parameter values. 
[insert Figure 5a here] 
Upon setting 11 == σν , consumption per capita gradually rises towards the new balanced growth path. 
Although factor inputs shift towards the R&D sector and the output of final goods drops as a result, the 
possibility of investing less and running down the capital stock enables consumption smoothing. To 
compare with previous studies, such as Kwan and Lai (2003), Figure 5b presents the transition dynamics 
for }1,0,06.0,7.0,7.0{},,,,{ =δθλγξ  as an approximation to a model with no capital accumulation. In 
this case, the result is consistent with Kwan and Lai (2003) that consumption falls in response to the 
                                                 
21
 Note that the coefficients are determined by )1/( φγ −  rather than the individual values of γ  and φ . 
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strengthening of patent protection. In this case, consumption falls by about 5% on impact and only 
recovers to its original growth path after 3 years. 
[insert Figure 5b here] 
 To ensure the robustness of this finding, a sensitivity analysis has been performed for different 
values of ξ  and γ . At a larger value of either ξ  or γ , consumption increases by even more on impact. 
A larger ξ  also implies a higher position of the new balanced-growth path. Holding ξ  constant, a larger 
γ  implies a faster rate of convergence. When both ξ  and γ  are small than 0.7, the household suffers 
consumption losses during the initial phase of the transition path. For example, Figure 5c presents the 
transition dynamics for }08.0,0,06.0,5.0,5.0{},,,,{ =δθλγξ . 
[insert Figure 5c here] 
However, Figure 5d shows that when ξ  is closed to one, γ  could be as small as 0.5 without causing any 
short-run consumption losses.  
[insert Figure 5d here] 
In summary, reallocating resources from the production sector to the R&D sector does not always lead to 
short-run consumption losses. Finally, at a larger value of λ , the calibrated value for ν  becomes smaller 
(see Table 1). This larger magnitude of the policy shock renders the algorithm unable to achieve 
convergence when ξ  and γ  are large. However, when the magnitude of the policy is small (e.g. ν  
increases from 0.5 to 1), convergence is always achieved.  
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper has attempted to accomplish three objectives. Firstly, it develops a tractable framework to 
model the transition dynamics of an economy with patent breadth and blocking patents in a generalized 
quality-ladder growth model. Secondly, it identifies a dynamic distortion on capital accumulation that has 
been neglected by previous studies on patent policy. Thirdly, it applies the model to the aggregate data to 
quantify the extents of underinvestment in R&D and inefficiency arising from blocking patents. The 
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numerical exercise suggests the following findings. The market economy underinvests in R&D so long as 
a non-negligible fraction of long-run TFP growth is driven by R&D. Eliminating blocking patents 
increases R&D by about two to six times, and the resulting effects on consumption can be substantial. 
 However, the readers should interpret the numerical results with some important caveats in mind. 
The first caveat is that although the quality-ladder model has been generalized as an attempt to capture 
more realistic features of the economy, it is still an oversimplification of the real world. In particular, the 
finding of eliminating blocking patents having a substantial positive effect on consumption is based on 
the assumptions that a non-negligible fraction of long-run TFP growth is driven by R&D and the data on 
private R&D spending is not incorrectly measured by an order of magnitude. The validity of these 
assumptions remains as an empirical question. Therefore, the numerical results should be viewed as 
illustrative at best. The second caveat is that the representative-agent setting ignores the distributional 
consequences of broadening patent protection, and the efficiency-equity tradeoff should be carefully 
considered by policymakers.  
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Appendix I: Proofs 
Lemma 1: The aggregate production function for the final goods is  
(a1) ααηϑ −= 1
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)( txtxttt LKZAY , 
where )1/()()( θθηϑ ηθη −+≡ zz  is decreasing in η  for )1,0(∈θ . 
 
Proof: Recall that the production function for the final goods is given by  
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for )1,0(∈θ . )(ηϑ  represents the static distortionary effect of markup pricing, and it enters the 
aggregate production function as   
(a6) ααηϑ −= 1
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Finally, simple differentiation shows that for )1,0(∈θ , 
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Proposition 1: )(
,
jV ti  for },...,2,1{ η∈i  and ]1,[θ∈j  is determined by the following law of motion 
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Proof: The expected present value of the ownership in patent pools for the i-th most recent inventor in 
industry ]1,[θ∈j  is 
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−= ∫
s
t
xs dxsf λλ exp)(  is the density function of s that is a random variable representing the 
time when the next innovation occurs and follows the Erlang distribution. The first term in )(
,
jV ti  is the 
expected present value of monopolistic profits captured by the i-th most recent inventor in the current 
patent pool. The second term in )(
,
jV ti  is the expected present value of the ownership in patent pools 
when the i-th most recent inventor becomes the i+1-th most recent inventor. Note that 0)(
,1 =+ jV tη  
because the 1+η -th most recent inventor is no longer in any patent pool. In order to derive (b1), I 
differentiate (b3) with respect to t. To simplify notations, I firstly define a new function such that (b3) 
becomes   
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∞
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Lemma 2: The modified Golden-rule rate of investment on the balanced-growth path is  
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Proof: To derive the socially optimal rate of investment and R&D shares of labor and capital, the social 
planner chooses ti , tLs ,  and tKs ,  to maximize  
(c4) ∫
∞
−
−−
−
−
=
0
1
)(
1
)/)1(( dtLYieU ttttn
σ
σ
ρ
 
subject to: (a) the aggregate production function expressed in terms of tLs ,  and tKs ,  given by 
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Note that the first-order conditions with respect to the co-state variables tK ,υ  and tA,υ  yield the law of 
motions for capital and R&D technology. Then, imposing the balanced-growth conditions yields 
(c14) ttK
t
t
i YiL
YiH
,
1
)1()1(: υ
σ
−=





−
−
,  
(c15) 








+





−
−
−
=





−
−
ttK
t
t
L
L
tAtAs iYL
Yi
s
sAgH
L ,
1
,
)1(
1
11
:
.
υβ
α
υγ
σ
,  
(c16) 








+





−
=





−
−
tK
t
t
K
K
tAtAs iYL
Yi
s
sAgH
K
υβ
α
υγ
σ1
,
)1(1
:
.
,  
(c17) tKtctAtAttK
t
t
K KgAgiYL
YiH
,,,
1
)()1(:
.
υδσρυβγυα
σ
++=+








+





−
−
,  
(c18) tAtActtK
t
t
A AggniYL
YiH
,,
1
))1()1(()1(: υφσρυ
σ
−+−+−=+





−
−
.  
Finally, solving (c14)-(c18) yields (c1)-(c3).■  
 
Proposition 2a: The decentralized equilibrium rate of investment is below the socially optimal investment 
rate if either there is underinvestment in R&D or labor is the only factor input for R&D.  
 
Proof: The socially optimal investment rate *i  is  
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Proposition 2b: Holding the backloading discount factor ν  constant, an increase in patent breadth leads 
to a reduction in the decentralized equilibrium rate of investment if the intermediate-goods sector is at 
least as capital intensive as the R&D sector.   
 
Proof: Differentiating i  with respect to η  yields  
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Since n>ρ  and 1≥σ , βα ≥  is a sufficient condition for 0/ <∂∂ ηi .■ 
 
Lemma 3: For βα = , the expression for the endogenous parts of consumption on the balanced-growth 
path is 
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Proof: The following derivation applies to the more general case in which α  and β  can be different. 
Without loss of generality, time is re-normalized such that time 0 is the first-period in which the economy 
reaches the balanced-growth path. The balanced-growth path of per capita consumption (in log) can be 
written as  
(e2) tgcc ct += 0lnln , 
where tgc  represents the exogenous growth path of consumption because of the semi-endogenous 
growth formulation. The balanced-growth level of per capital consumption at time 0 is   
(e3) 
α
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where 0Z  is normalized to one. The capital-labor ratio 00 / LK  and the level of R&D-driven technology 
0A  at time 0 are respectively  
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After dropping the exogenous growth path and some constant terms, the expression for the endogenous 
parts of per capita consumption on the balanced-growth path that depends on )(~ ηϑ , ),( νηi , ),( νηKs  
and ),( νηLs  is  
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Finally, after setting βα =  and dropping )(~ ηϑ , (e6) becomes (e1).■ 
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Appendix II: Lagging Breath 
Incomplete lagging breadth delimits a patentholder’s property rights over her invention. The following 
formulation of lagging breadth originates from Li (2001). Assume zero leading breadth 0=leadη  as in 
standard models for now. To reiterate, each invention is a quality improvement of z , and this production 
technology, once invented, becomes public knowledge to fulfill the disclosure requirement for obtaining a 
patent. In the case of complete lagging breadth, the patent for )( jmt  allows the new industry leader to 
produce with any technology level ],( )(1)( jmjm tt zz −∈ , but the profit-maximizing level is )( jmtz . The 
former industry leader, who holds the patent for 1)( −jmt , is also technologically feasible to upgrade its 
production process. However, to do so, she would infringe the patent of the new industry leader, and any 
licensing agreement would drive the licensee’s profits to zero.  
 The parameter 1≤lagη  represents the degree of lagging breadth. In the special case of complete 
lagging breadth 1=lagη , any technology level beyond 1)( −jmtz  is protected by the patent for )( jmt . In 
the case of incomplete lagging breadth 1<lagη , only technology level beyond lagt
jm
z
η−)(
 is protected. The 
following diagram illustrates the concept of incomplete lagging breadth. 
 
In other words, although the invention is a quality improvement of z , the patent only protects part of this 
invention lagzη  against imitation. Therefore, with incomplete lagging breadth, the Bertrand equilibrium 
price is )()( jMCzjP tt lagη=  and the amount of monopolistic profits is )()()1()( jXjMCzj ttt lag −= ηpi  
for )1,0(∈lagη  and ]1,[θ∈j . Incomplete patent protection against imitation forces the industry leader to 
lower its markup. On one hand, incomplete lagging breadth reduces the distortionary effects of markup 
pricing; on the other hand, the reduced profit worsens the incentives for R&D due to incomplete property 
rights over an invention. 
1)( −jmtz  )( jmtz  patent protection 
lagt jmz
η−)(
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Appendix III: Transition Dynamics 
This appendix provides the details of transforming the variables in equations (39) - (42) into their 
stationary forms for the purpose of computing the transition dynamics numerically. To simplify the 
analysis, the transformation is performed for the special case of βα = . The Euler equation is  
(f1) σρ /)( −= ttt rcc& . 
Define a stationary variable )1/(1)/(~ α−≡ tttt ZAcc , and its resulting law of motion is 
(f2) )ln(
1
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t
t gzr
c
c
+
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−−= λ
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σ
&
. 
The law of motion for physical capital is  
(f3) δtttt KCYK −−=& . 
Define a stationary variable ))(/( )1/(1 α−≡ ttttt ZALKk , and its resulting law of motion is  
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The law of motion for R&D-driven technology is  
(f5) zAA ttt lnλ=& . 
Define a stationary variable ϕγααγφααγαγ ttttt LZAka )1/()1()1/( −−−−≡ , and its resulting law of motion is  
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The law of motion for the market value of ownership in patent pools is given by  
(f7) titittittti VVrV piσλλ −−+= + ,1,, )(&  
for },...,2,1{ η∈i  and 0
,1 =+ tVη . Define a stationary variable ))(/(~ )1/(1,, α−≡ ttttiti ZALVv , and its 
resulting law of motion is  
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for },...,2,1{ η∈i  and 0~
,1 =+ tvη . To close this system of differential equations, the endogenous variables 
},,{
., ttrt
sr λ  are also expressed in terms of the four newly defined stationary variables. The interest rate is  
(f9) δµθµθηαϑ α −−+= − /)1()( 1tt kr . 
From the first-order condition of the R&D sector, the share of factor inputs in R&D is  
(f10) 
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From the law of motion of R&D-driven technology, the Poisson arrival rate of innovations is  
(f11) ttrt as
γλ
,.
= . 
Finally, the steady-state values of the variables are  
(f12) zg A ln/=λ , 
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for },...,2,1{ η∈i  and 0~ 1 =+ηv . Note that upon eliminating blocking patents, the backloading discount 
factor ν  and the share of profits captured by the most recent inventor 1σ  become one. 
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λ ν α σ r µ λ ν α σ r µ
0.04 0.339 0.240 3.672 0.104 1.100 0.04 0.348 0.241 3.736 0.105 1.136
0.06 0.268 0.240 3.672 0.104 1.100 0.06 0.275 0.241 3.736 0.105 1.136
0.08 0.232 0.240 3.672 0.104 1.100 0.08 0.238 0.241 3.736 0.105 1.136
0.10 0.211 0.240 3.672 0.104 1.100 0.10 0.216 0.241 3.736 0.105 1.136
0.12 0.197 0.240 3.672 0.104 1.100 0.12 0.201 0.241 3.736 0.105 1.136
0.14 0.187 0.240 3.672 0.104 1.100 0.14 0.191 0.241 3.736 0.105 1.136
0.16 0.179 0.240 3.672 0.104 1.100 0.16 0.183 0.241 3.736 0.105 1.136
0.18 0.173 0.240 3.672 0.104 1.100 0.18 0.177 0.241 3.736 0.105 1.136
0.20 0.169 0.240 3.672 0.104 1.100 0.20 0.172 0.241 3.736 0.105 1.136
λ ν α σ r µ λ ν α σ r µ
0.04 0.366 0.243 3.859 0.108 1.210 0.04 0.424 0.249 4.197 0.114 1.464
0.06 0.288 0.243 3.859 0.108 1.210 0.06 0.331 0.249 4.197 0.114 1.464
0.08 0.249 0.243 3.859 0.108 1.210 0.08 0.285 0.249 4.197 0.114 1.464
0.10 0.226 0.243 3.859 0.108 1.210 0.10 0.257 0.249 4.197 0.114 1.464
0.12 0.210 0.243 3.859 0.108 1.210 0.12 0.238 0.249 4.197 0.114 1.464
0.14 0.199 0.243 3.859 0.108 1.210 0.14 0.225 0.249 4.197 0.114 1.464
0.16 0.191 0.243 3.859 0.108 1.210 0.16 0.215 0.249 4.197 0.114 1.464
0.18 0.184 0.243 3.859 0.108 1.210 0.18 0.207 0.249 4.197 0.114 1.464
0.20 0.179 0.243 3.859 0.108 1.210 0.20 0.201 0.249 4.197 0.114 1.464
Table 1a: Structural Parameters for θ = 0 Table 1b: Structural Parameters for θ = 0.25
Table 1c: Structural Parameters for θ = 0.5 Table 1d: Structural Parameters for θ = 0.75
 
ξ / γ 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 ξ / γ 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
1.00 0.64 0.29 -0.07 -0.42 -0.78 1.00 0.64 0.29 -0.07 -0.42 -0.78
0.80 0.56 0.11 -0.33 -0.78 -1.22 0.80 0.56 0.11 -0.33 -0.78 -1.22
0.60 0.41 -0.18 -0.78 -1.37 -1.96 0.60 0.41 -0.19 -0.78 -1.37 -1.96
0.40 0.11 -0.78 -1.66 -2.55 -3.44 0.40 0.11 -0.78 -1.67 -2.56 -3.45
0.20 -0.78 -2.55 -4.33 -6.10 -7.88 0.20 -0.78 -2.56 -4.33 -6.11 -7.89
ξ / γ 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 ξ / γ 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
1.00 0.64 0.29 -0.07 -0.43 -0.78 1.00 0.64 0.28 -0.08 -0.43 -0.79
0.80 0.55 0.11 -0.34 -0.78 -1.23 0.80 0.55 0.10 -0.34 -0.79 -1.24
0.60 0.41 -0.19 -0.78 -1.38 -1.97 0.60 0.40 -0.20 -0.79 -1.39 -1.99
0.40 0.11 -0.78 -1.67 -2.56 -3.46 0.40 0.10 -0.79 -1.69 -2.59 -3.48
0.20 -0.78 -2.56 -4.35 -6.13 -7.91 0.20 -0.79 -2.59 -4.38 -6.17 -7.96
Table 2a: ϕ for θ  = 0 Table 2b: ϕ for θ  = 0.25
Table 2c: ϕ for θ  = 0.5 Table 2d: ϕ for θ  = 0.75
 
θ / λ 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.20
0.00 3.4% 4.3% 4.9% 5.4% 5.8% 6.1% 6.4% 6.6% 6.8%
0.25 3.3% 4.2% 4.8% 5.3% 5.7% 6.0% 6.3% 6.5% 6.7%
0.50 3.1% 4.0% 4.6% 5.1% 5.5% 5.8% 6.0% 6.2% 6.4%
0.75 2.7% 3.5% 4.0% 4.5% 4.8% 5.1% 5.3% 5.5% 5.7%
Table 3: R&D Shares without Blocking Patents
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Figure 1: Private Spending on R&D as a Share of GDP
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Data Sources: (a) Bureau of Economic Analysis: National Income and Product Accounts Tables; and (b) National 
Science Foundation: Division of Science Resources Statistics.  
Footnote: R&D is net of federal spending, and GDP is net of government spending. 
Figure 2: Number of Patents Granted
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Data Source: Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2002): The NBER Patent Citation Data File. 
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Figure 3a: First-Best Optimal R&D Shares for θ = 0
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Figure 3b: First-Best Optimal R&D Shares for θ = 0.25
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Figure 3c: First-Best Optimal R&D Shares for θ = 0.5
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Figure 3d: First-Best Optimal R&D Shares for θ = 0.75
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Figure 4a: Change in Long-Run Consumption from Eliminating Blocking Patents for θ = 0
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Figure 4b: Change in Long-Run Consumption from Eliminating Blocking Patents for θ = 0.25
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Figure 4c: Change in Long-Run Consumption from Eliminating Blocking Patents for θ = 0.5
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Figure 4d: Change in Long-Run Consumption from Eliminating Blocking Patents for θ = 0.75
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Figure 5a: Transition Dynamics of Consumption for ξ = γ = 0.7 with Partial Capital Depreciation 
 
Figure 5b: Transition Dynamics of Consumption for ξ = γ = 0.7 with Complete Capital Depreciation 
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Figure 5c: Transition Dynamics of Consumption for ξ = γ = 0.5 with Partial Capital Depreciation 
 
Figure 5d: Transition Dynamics of Consumption for ξ = 0.95 and γ = 0.5 with Partial Capital Depreciation 
 
